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Abs t r ac t . As a common reference for many in-development standards 
and execution frameworks, special attention is being paid to Service-
Oriented Architectures. SOAs modeling, however, is an área in which a 
consensus has not being achieved. Currently, standardization organiza-
tions are defining proposals to offer a solution to this problem. Never-
theless, until very recently, non-functional aspects of services have not 
been considered for standardization processes. In particular, there exists 
a lack of a design solution that permits an independent development of 
the functional and non-functional concerns of SOAs, allowing that each 
concern be addressed in a convenient manner in early stages of the de-
velopment, in a way that could guarantee the quality of this type of 
systems. This paper, leveraging on previous work, presents an approach 
to intégrate security-related non-functional aspects (such as confidential-
ity, integrity, and access control) in the development of services. 
1 Introduction 
Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA), of great popularity nowadays, and Web 
Services (WS), the technology generally used to implement them, go hand in 
hand in such a way tha t they are even referred to as WSOA (Web Service Ori-
ented Architecture). They achieve the integration of heterogeneous technologies, 
providing interoperability, and yielding the reutilization of pre-existent systems. 
At the same time, Model Driven Applications (MDA) [14] arises as a new 
paradigm tha t tries to shift models out of a mere documentary role, and turn 
them into a first class development artifact. This approach provides, among 
other benefits, a greater understanding of the system as a whole and a platform-
independent development, improving the reusability of the design, and simplify-
ing the evolution of the system, thus increasing productivity. 
WS-* s tandards provide a strong foundation for the development of ser-
vices. WS-Policy and related specifications offer the possibility of considering 
extra-functional concerns of those services. However, these specifications are 
XML-based, and its syntax is not designed to be read/wr i t ten by humans. An 
abstraction of such languages is desirable. 
From the experience obtained during the participation in a research project 
focused on the service-oriented reformulation of a banking core [3], the need 
for means to independently address non-functional properties (NFPs) to foster 
design (functional and non-functional) reuse along different companies became 
evident. Different modeling techniques and approaches in use among the differ-
ent financial institutions made input-models-language independence fundamen-
tal. Moreover, the secrecy of security designs is also paramount; security de-
sign should only be accessed by trusted number of individuáis. Different banks 
use different infrastructures, and different security solutions and approaches, 
for instance. It is the authors' belief that this situation repeats itself in other 
industries. 
If the research's results were to be useful throughout the banking industry, 
the NFPs of the systems had to be supported in different shapes and forms. 
A clear candidate approach to address this issue, therefore, is that proposed 
by Multi-Dimensional Separation of Concerns (MDSoC) [21], and seconded in 
Viewpoints [7], aspect-oriented modeling (AOM) or early aspects (EA) [5,17]. 
These approaches share common ideas, and allow for the separation of functional 
and extra-functional characteristics of the systems at design time, providing a 
base for the solution presented in this paper. 
Within these different views or concerns of the system, the elements have 
to be described somehow. In general, aspect-oriented solutions prefer general 
purpose modeling languages (GPMLs) for this task. GPMLs' approach towards 
this problem is to provide extensión mechanisms to adapt the generic modeling 
elements to the particular concern or domain that is being addressed by the 
model. Domain-specific modeling languages (DSMLs), however, takes a different 
approach, and reduce the available modeling elements to key, familiar problem-
domain concepts (and rules), narrowing down the design space [8], to achieve 
higher levéis of productivity. In the approach presented in this paper, DSMLs 
have been selected to appropriately address the different NFPs. 
A final element of concern is the technical expertize needed to express correct 
(both syntactically and conceptually) security and other NFPs' configurations. 
One of the ideas in SOA is that business be aligned with the IT infrastruc-
ture. Therefore, stakeholders at the business level are candidate to providing 
input models of the system. Nevertheless, these stakeholders, although capable 
of expressing security intentions or requirements to these business services, are 
probably not security savvy enough to express a complete security configuration, 
ñor are aware of the availability of the different security infrastructure elements. 
Although múltiple implementation technologies exist to facilítate the devel-
opment of web services and SOA systems, the lack of a sound methodological 
base for the development of such applications stresses the need for new modeling 
methods or techniques that could guarantee the quality of the development of 
this type of systems. In summary, it was identified that there exists a lack of a 
design solution that: 
— Allows an independent development of the functional and non-functional 
(NF) concerns of service-oriented architectures, fostering reuse. 
— Permits that each concern be addressed in a convenient manner, at the 
appropriate abstraction level. 
— Avoids the need for non-functional (in this case, security) expertize at the 
business/system architect role. 
— Is modular enough so that the functional model is not polluted with non-
functional information, and secrecy of security design could be maintained. 
— Provides a practical way of measuring and analyzing the system for non-
functional characteristics in early stages of the development. 
Some approaches applying MD A to the development of Web Services already ex-
ist (e.g. [16], [10]). However, these approaches do not offer thorough support for 
access control (AC) descriptors, code generation, Web Services Description Lan-
guage (WSDL), and WS-(Security)Policy This paper, leveraging on previous 
work, introduces the CIM-to-PIM layer of an approach to intégrate security-
related non-functional aspects (such as confidentiality, integrity, and AC) in the 
development of services, parting from high-level descriptions of business services 
compositions, and incorporating technical elements through a chain of transfor-
mation and compositions, towards the final implementation of the individual, 
security-aware services. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the general architecture 
of the approach, while section 3 introduces the Supply Chain Management [25] 
use case, and describes its implementation along the steps of the proposed solu-
tion. Section 4 presents some relevant related work. Finally, section 5 provides 
some conclusions and possible future lines of work. 
2 Integrating the Non-functional Concerns 
As first presented in [19], a complete solution addressing non-functional aspects 
of service architectures was defined. The addressed characteristics are NF prop-
erties subject of being described as policies, of which security and access control 
are prominent examples. This section presents the methodology proposed to 
intégrate these non-functional aspects in the development of web services. A 
well-known use case, including security concerns, has been selected to illustrate 
the usefulness of the approach. 
2.1 A Framework for the Inclusión of Security Concerns 
Figure 1 shows the overall structure of the designed solution, consisting of a 
chain of model transformations and compositions (indicated by arrows). Every 
box in the figure indicates a different type of model, including: 
— Business model indicating non-functional intentions (CIM Level). 
— Functional system model (PIM 1 Level). 
— Non-functional properties models (PIM 1 Level). 
— Intermedíate Meta Model (iMM) model (PIM 2 Level). 
— WSDL, WS-Policy, and XML models (PSM Level). 
The iMM metamodel was defined with the objective of achieving an abstraction 
both of input modeling techniques/metamodels, and output target platforms. 
It is also designed for holding, in one unique model, all information necessary 
for analysis and to genérate the different output artifacts. The different steps' 
resulting artifacts, including the iMM models, are automatically generated, and 
the developers need never interact with them if unwanted. However, the mod-
eler has the opportunity to tune/modify the intermedíate results to shape the 
subsequent outcome. 
The presented approach proposes the development of each individual con-
cern as an independent model, in a similar fashion to that of Multi-Dimensional 
Separation of Concerns [21]. Different domain-specific metamodels, each one ap-
propriate to the particular concern in hand, are used to define the non-functional 
models. The addressed security concerns are individually mapped from the iMM 
into implementation artifacts in the target platform, independently of the par-
ticular services under design. 
In that way, the system under implementation provides the particular valúes 
for the final implementation elements, but concern models (and their mappings 
onto the platform) may evolve independently. Such models are composed into a 
complete model of the system by weaving them together. A possible set of meta-
models for the consideration of security concerns in service-oriented architectures 
is presented in [19] and included in section 2.3. 
For the generation, the process model is split into atomic services and their 
associated NF intents. The different resulting outputs to be obtained, indicated 
in figure 1, include access-control descriptors (platform dependant), code tem-
plates (platform dependant), and WSDL and WS-Policy documents (common to 
all target platforms). The composition execution should then make use of these 
artifacts to execute the process. 
2.2 Development Process 
The sequence of steps to perform in the proposed approach, leveraging on that 
first introduced in [19], is presented here: 
1. A business process model, annotated with abstract security intents (also 
known as primitives), is presented as input to the process. 
2. The intents at CIM level drive the selection of the appropriate security and 
access-control models. The developer selects, tunes, or even defines new AC 
and security models, as better fits the system. 
3. A functional PIM model is derived from the CIM model or, alternatively, 
provided by the modeler as an input functional model at PIM level (PIM 1). 
4. By means of composition models, the modeler indicates which non-functional 
properties should be associated to which resources in the functional model. 
Ideally, pre-filled composition models should be proposed by a tool automat-
ing the development process. 
5. At this stage, the platform-independent iMM model (PIM 2) contains all 
(functional and extra-functional) information. 
6. Next, the iMM model is transformed into platform dependant (PSM) mod-
els. Default valúes may be used for the generation, unless optional platform 
information (indicating preferences and/or availability of platform charac-
teristics) is fed to the transformation. In the example presented in this paper, 
assertions in a WS-SecurityPolicy metamodel, extended with a "preference" 
attribute, may be used for representing the available/preferred mechanisms 
to use from the target platform. 
7. Finally, service and policy descriptors are derived from the PIM 2 model. 
Resulting WSDL documents hold references to the appropriate policies de-
fined in the different generated WS-Policy documents. Simultaneously, code 
templates and non-functional configurations are automatically created. 
Fig. 1. Structure of the proposed solution 
Within the process model, the modeler may express high level security intents 
(e.g., non-repudiation, confidentiality, integrity), instead of technical mechanisms 
which are necessary to achieve them (e.g., encryption, signature, time-stamping). 
The know-how of the mechanisms necessary to achieve the intents is contained in 
the metadata and the transformations. In this way, the business/system architect 
is freed from the need of technical security knowledge. 
Repositories containing different expert-made AC and security models could 
provide the non-functional inputs. The idea behind the approach is that different 
NF models, suitable for different concerns in different domains, would represent 
a pool of options from which to select the most appropriate one. Experts in the 
particular NF domain créate such models, and also indicate how the different 
elements map onto the target platform. Adequate metadata is associated to 
these models for automatic discovery support. In that way, appropriate models 
are automatically selected from the repositories and offered to the modeler. 
Analyses and metrics, performed and calculated on the iMM model, reassure 
the modeler confidence in the correctness of the design. Errors detected in this 
stage are less costly to correct, and the system architect may have the opportu-
nity to consult a domain expert to solve any complicated issue. 
The benefits of this approach is twofold: the system's developer need not 
be security savvy, and allows greater reuse of (functional and non-functional) 
designs. NF models may be reused among different projects. Also, different NF 
characteristics may be applied to the same functional design to genérate different 
resulting systems. 
2.3 Metamodels 
Referring to the metamodels employed in this solution, some pre-existent meta-
models have been adopted, some other were merged together, whilst the rest 
had to be defined for the occasion. The different metamodels presented here, are 
described in more detail in [19]. 
Modelíng Security Intents at the CIM Level. Business processes diagrams have 
become the mainstream alternative to model the compositions and interactions 
of services. Such models provide a great means for describing the interaction of 
the services at a high level of abstraction. They also represent an outstanding 
instrument on which to express abstract non-functional intentions that allow 
stakeholders to express their security concerns without the need for a detailed 
technical knowledge. Ontologies have risen as useful tools to agree on a com-
mon language for the description and discovery of elements (web services, for 
instance). The use of an ontology at the CIM level may provide not only a means 
to define a common vocabulary for security intents, but may also represent a tool 
for the matchmaking 1 of the non-functional concerns models contained in the 
repositories that may fulfill the expressed requirements. 
In the security domain, the NRL ontology [9] represents a very complete op-
tion, scoping from high-level security objectives, through security credentials, to 
technical encryption algorithms, and has been selected to formalize a vocabulary 
for the security intents. 
Functional Input Metamodel: UML. If a PIM level input is to be provided, UML, 
the modeling standard of choice in most cases nowadays, has been selected as 
the input's metamodel. UML's SoaML profile [2] was implemented and applied 
to these input models to guide the UML-to-iMM transformation. 
1
 The process of identifying the elements that fulfill the imposed requirements, and 
its degree of fulfillment. 
Security Metamodel: QoS Metamodel. UML's QoS profile [22] defines the "QoS 
Pramework Metamodel" as an extensión to UML's metamodel. The defined con-
cepts can be used to model non-functional characteristics as a domain-specific 
metamodel (as in, for instance, [10]). This is the metamodel selected to illustrate 
the use of the approach being presented. 
Access Control Metamodel: SecureUML. SecureUML [11], a Role Based Access 
Control (RBAC, one of the currently most used AC techniques) metamodel 
is used to exemplify possible access-control input models. The modeling and 
implementation of AC, which follows a similar process to that of the security 
properties, is not included in this article. 
Weavíng Metamodels. Weaving metamodels guide the composition mechanisms 
of the different models. In this case, the composition of functional models with 
AC models or security models require different weaving associations, described 
in [19]. The semantics of the associations are implemented as part of the com-
position rules. 
íMM Metamodel. The intermedíate metamodel is one of the fundamental parts 
of this approach. Composed of three differentiated parts (System Design, Ac-
cess Control, and Policy), this particular implementation, described in [19], was 
designed to be as general as possible, in order to maximize support for AC 
techniques and policy standards. 
The functional part of the metamodel follows a component-based approach, 
and is used to describe service components, entities and interfaces, among other 
metaclasses. The generic metamodel from [15], incorporated in the "Access Con-
trol" part, allows for the use of different access-control techniques (and mutation 
among them). Finally, the "Policy" package of CBDI-SAE Meta Model for SOA 
[4] was selected for the service policies part. The three selected metamodels were 
then studied to identify equivalent concepts that provided merging points. 
An integrated metamodel, such as iMM, provides a great subject of analysis 
and metrics' calculations. In this particular control conflicts analysis, 
or security coverage metrics, for instance, could be defined. Analyses and metrics 
for iMM models are out of the scope of this paper. 
WSDL Metamodel. A WSDL metamodel has been used for the transformations, 
and in the compositions (in order to visualize the future WSDL document as a 
model and facilítate the specification of policy application points). 
WS-Polícy Metamodel. Equivalently, a WS-Policy metamodel has been devel-
oped. The transformations and later generation of WS-Policy documents opérate 
on this metamodel, including the case of WS-SecurityPolicy models. 
WS-S ecurítyP oücy Metamodel. A WS-Security Policy metamodel has been de-
fined as an extensión to the WS-Policy metamodel, providing a means to edit 
and validate security policy assertions, and to indicate the platform's security 
capabilities and preferences. It is, to the best knowledge of the authors, the first 
available implementation of a WS-SecurityPolicy metamodel. 
3 WS-I 's Supply Chain Management Use Case 
To illustrate the use of the proposed approach, the Web Services Interoperability 
Organization's (WS-I) [23] Supply Chain Management (SCM) use case [25] has 
been selected. 
The SCM application [25,24] presents a typical business-to-consumer (B2C) 
model: a Retaíler offering electronic goods to consumers. To fulfill orders the Re-
taíler has to request producís ("shipGoods" operation) and manage stock levéis 
in the three Warehouses. When an item in stock falls below a certain threshold, 
the Warehouse must restock the item from the relevant Manufactureras inven-
tory ("POSubmit" operation, a typical business-to-business (B2B) model). A 
complete description of the use case architecture's can be found in [25], and in 
[26] for security requirements. Access-control was originally not addressed in this 
use case, and will not be included in the example in this paper. 
Two frameworks for the Java programming language have been selected to 
support the execution of the system: 
— Spring framework [20], a framework leveraging enterprise-level functionalities 
for Java POJOs (Plain Oíd Java Objects). 
— Apache CXF [1] framework, supporting policies and Literal and RPC style 
Web Services (as demanded by the SCM use case specification). 
Frameworks provide much functionality which would be otherwise necessary to 
genérate for the execution of the different systems, greatly simplifying the de-
velopment of generators. Newer frameworks' declarative-based configuration, in 
particular, support the configuration of non-functional characteristics of the ser-
vices (such as security or AC, in this case) independently of the functional code. 
This is of great usefulness in this case, allowing for an independent generation of 
the different artifacts, and the reuse of generators for different target platforms. 
3.1 Creating and Selecting the Input Models 
A process model of the system is considered as the primary input. This model, 
annotated with security and access control intents, indicates the non-functional 
requirements on the different services. For instance, an interaction marked "non-
repudiation" would imply associating to the message the actions of authenticat-
ing, signing and time-stamping. The NRL ontology [9], designed to facilítate 
automatic discovery and invocation, has been selected in this example to for-
malize the vocabulary for the annotation. Using NRL's matchmaking algorithm, 
different matching security and AC models are presented to the modeler for se-
lection. In this case, the QoS model would match the different security required 
characteristics, as it models the security mechanisms to satisfy them. 
Table 1. QoS Catalog for the QoS Category "Security" 
Int 
Conf 
Auth 
Dimensión 
IntegrityAlg. 
TimestampRequired 
EncryptSignature 
Signature Encryption 
Algorithm 
Crypto Alg. 
TokenType 
TokenKey Alg. 
SignToken 
EncryptToken 
Unit Type 
Enum. Literal 
Boolean 
Boolean 
Crypto Alg. 
String 
Enum. Literal 
Enum. Literal 
Boolean 
Boolean 
shipGoodsRequest 
SHA1 
true 
true 
Crypto Alg.'s 
valué 
AES256 
X509 
RSA15 
true 
true 
Retailer System's UML Model. Functional models of the system will most 
likely be derived from the process model, developed from scratch to satisfy it, 
or reused from a previous system model (perhaps even reverse-engineered from 
legacy code). The 'de facto' standard for functional systems' modeling is UML, 
so it was decided to use it to model the Retailer system. As described in section 
2.3, the SoaML profile is used to guide the posterior transformation. UML class 
diagrams for all the services in the SCM example are available in [25]. 
Modeling of the Security Intents with the QoS Metamodel. The first 
step towards modeling security concepts under the QoS metamodel is defining 
a QoS Catalog for the target (one or more) QoS Category. A catalog defines 
the different characteristics (may be regarded as meta-classes in a metamodel) 
and dimensions (the variables defining a particular characteristic) that may be 
present in a model of such category. In this particular case, only one category will 
be modeled: Security. Within this category, three characteristics are defined: In-
tegrity, Confidentiality, and Authentication. Table 1 presents the different QoS 
Dimensions defined for these three characteristics, and the valúes assigned to 
them in the case of the "shipGoodsRequest" message of the "shipGoods" oper-
ation, offered by the Warehouse and used by the Retailer services. 
3.2 Transformation into the iMM Model 
Composition of Retailer System's UML Model with Non-Functional 
Models. Having two different non-functional aspects of the system under con-
sideration, two composition models are necessary. The first one relates the 
Retailer system elements with the security characteristics in the QoS model. 
Figure 2 presents the three panel view provided by the AMW tool [6] to cré-
ate such composition models. In this figure, the different model elements are 
associated to its security requirements. The figure brings out, for instance, the 
association of "ShipGoodsResponse" with the security characteristics of signing, 
with the corresponding Warehouse X.509 certifícate, the message and times-
tamp. The composition mechanism for SecureUML input models is equivalent. 
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Fig. 2. Composition of Retailer's QoS and UML Models 
3.3 Generation of Resulting Artifacts 
For the generation of both WSDL and WS-Policy documents, the models are 
first transforrned into a XML rnodel and later extracted into the final XML syn-
tax. The resulting WSDL documents (not included, equivalent to those in [25]) 
reference, within the description of the service elements, the corresponding ser-
vice policies. The resulting WS-Policy document (figure 3) contains the policies 
applied to the Warehouse service (correspondent to the requirements and the 
QoS input model) and provide an equivalent expression, in WS-SecurityPolicy 
assertions, to the security configurations described below. The description of the 
generation of the functional code is out of the scope of the paper. 
Generation of the WS-Security Configuration. The following configu-
ration elements represent the target platform's results for the non-functional 
concerns requirements. All information necessary to genérate the non-functional 
configuration files is available in the iMM model. 
Figure 4 shows an excerpt of the configuration file generated for the Ware-
house service. In it, the "WarehouseA" service is defined as a jaxws:endpoint and 
configured correspondingly. The actual bean implementing the service ("ware-
house AService") is passed as a reference to the endpoint. The implementor bean 
is itself configured with the different properties it requires. 
Security interceptors are also defined for the service endpoint. Only the output 
interceptor ("WarehouseEndTimestampSign_Response") is presented in figure 
4 for visualization. The input interceptor's configuration is very similar, and 
therefore excluded. Security interceptors' configuration represent, therefore, the 
actual piece of the configuration file that depends of the security policy part of 
the iMM model. 
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ísp:IncludeTiinestainp wap:Ignorable = n f a l 3 e ' wapíQptional = ' f a l s e T / > 
<sp : In i t i a t o rTo*en wspilgnocable = ' f a l s e 1 wap:Opcional = ' f e l s e ' > 
-0;rsp:Fclicy :.£::.= - ' I s i i i c ' c r l c ^ a r i l i s s ' s d r c i i c v 1 v; : . :"^ - ' Init iaE£rIa)renNestedP3lic:i r '> 
-íwsp;All> 
-<sp: JÜ50 jTcíen vrap : Ig::c-r¿b!£ = ' f a l s e ' vrap: Cfcic-nd! = ' f d í a s ' 
ap i lnc lude laken = ' h t c p ; /,'dcG3 . c á s i s - s p e n . cr j/v-3-SK;.vg-securi7;jxclisy/2üü"02.. Irj^ludeTci"erj,"Al"v"i.j"SicRecipienL.1> 
<wsp:Policí ñame = 'InitiaEsrTaX-enXSQSTofceTiNestsdPülicy' wsurld = 1Initiac;i:T;Jí-enX5C'9TctínHestedPilicy1> 
<wsp:W.l> 
<sp¡WssX509V3TolerLlO wsp:Ignorable = ' f a l a e 1 wspiOptioaal = ' f a l a e ' » 
</wsp:All> 
</wsp:Policy> 
</sp:X509ToteiI> 
</wsp:All> 
</wsp:Policy> 
í / s p : I n i t i a t o r T o i e n > 
<sp:RecipientToken wspilgnocable = ' f a l s e 1 wspiOpcional = ' f a l s e ' > 
^.•rspiPclicj •=::.= = 'ri=ri].:isr."rc. j:a:.;iss^sdrciicv ¡ ••••?..:-:• = ' R=cipier:-7c>:=r:ij=£^="j;;ii;v'> 
•Cwsp: All> 
-<sp : JÜ50 jTcíen vrap : Ignorable = ' f a l s e ' waprpptional = 'fala-e1 
sp: IncludeTeten = lhtcp://dcc3.c£3Í3-üpeii . í!i :g/ , - , . -3-3!t/v3-3ecuriri 'p-lic^/2007Ci2/IncludeIükeri/Ali.a73TsIrii i iai:or l> 
<wsp:Policí ñame = 'RecipientTak-enXSQSTofceTiNestsdFülicy' wsurld = 'RecipientTn):enX!5ü9Tül:enHe3tedPGlicY'> 
<wsp:ftll> 
<sp: WssX505V3Tole-nlO i.'3p: Ignorable = ' f a l a e 1 wsp:Opcional = t f a l 9 e ' / > 
</wsp:All> 
</wsp:Policy> 
</sp:X509ToteiI> 
</wsp;All> 
</wap:Policy> 
</sp:RecipientToien> 
<sp:Algorithii iSuite wsp;Ignorable = ' f a l s e 1 wsprCpcional = ' f e l s e ' > 
<wsp:Policy ñame = •ÜgGxi.tfatíSHitefiestedPGlicy1 w s u : I d = 'Algcrichjr .SuiteNescedPil iGi '^ 
•Cwsp: All> 
<sp:Basiol28RsalE wsp:Ignorable = + f a l s e ' wapiOptional = •£HX«K: , /> 
</wsp:All> 
</wsp:Policy> 
</sp:Algori thmSuite> 
</sp:AsyinmetrÍGBinding> 
<sp:5ign&dParts wsp:Ignorable = T f a l ge ' wapiOptional = ' f a i ™ ' > 
<sp:Header wspi lgnorable = ' f a l s e 1 wsp;3pcional = ' f a l s e ' Ñame = 'Cünf igura t icnñeadec ' 
Namespace = 1htrp://nTvv.ws-i.ci:g/SempleAFplicaLiiris/5upplyChai^;ariiaeT.enz/2 iJ iJ2-riS/ííe!:ehcuse ' /> 
<sp:Body wsp; Ignorable - ' f a l s e ' wsp;Cptic¡nal = ' ! « ! •»* /> 
- í /sp:SignedParts> 
</usp:Al i> 
</wsp:Policy> 
Fig. 3. Warehouse Service's WS-Policy document 
Within this configuration, and encircled, two entries stand out: 
— the different securing actions to be performed (key= "action" and, according 
to the requirements, value= "Timestamp Signature"), 
— the actual elements to be signed (key= "signatureParts" and, again following 
the requirements, value= "..Tirnestarnp; ..Body; ..Header"). 
The presented use case, although briefly described, illustrates how the proposed 
approach provides mechanisms to address the objectives placed in section 1. Ab-
stract NF intents are first mapped to NF design models, composed into a com-
plete system model, refined, and finally mapped to implementation artifacts. The 
security interceptors and the access control context's elements (not presented) 
represent the mappings from the respective security and access control concerns. 
The iMM model of the system provides the particular valúes for elements (e.g., 
the security actions to perform). In this way, different concerns models, indepen-
dently managed (maintained, evolved, mapped to target platforms, etc.) may be 
re-used for the implementation of different systems. 
<3xml versioíi="l . O" encading=ITUTF-8'T?> 
<fcearis Jímlns = ITlitCp: //www. springf lair.ework. Grg/schenr.a/beans" 
xmlns : j axws = " 5it t p : //CAÍ . apache . Qrg/jaxw3N . . . > 
< i ~ SERVICES - EarehoaseA—> 
•'. jaxws : endpoint id="warehou3eA" a.ddiess="/wa:reh.ou3eA" 
implementorClass=rio:rg .ws i.. 3anpleapplicat ions . . . . Warehou.seASeTviceN> 
íjaxws :ircplemeíitoz> 
<zef bear]="warehouseA5ervicerr/> 
í/iaxws : ireplementoZJ-
' jaxws lOTitlntezcectozs.--
<ref tiean="Wdreh.ou.3eEndTiiLe3tajEp5igr'._Respoii3e,T/> 
< • jaxws : autInterceptors> 
í jaxws:inIi i terceptors> 
</jaxws:inI^terceptor3> 
<•• jaKws: endpoiiit> 
•fcean id="warehou3eA3erv±ceM class=nor5.w3 i . sauípleapplications . . . . WarehouseiSeivice"> 
íproper ty name=nlogStuhIT Tef=ITlo[jgir.gClieritlV> 
-.prapezty name= "nLar.ufacturerA5ervi.een zef=riniay.ufacturerAClieritn/> 
</bean> 
< ! - - WS24JCi2tIn.t-Bm-sptor for tnne^tamping' and signing- the ££AP r^E^sponse. - -> 
Icear. 
id=riWarehou3eEr.dTirf.e3tarcp5igr_Re3poc.3err 
class= , rorg .apache .CKZ.W3.secur i ty . W334;] . W5S4JCut In terceptor" > 
<coiistiuctQi-arg> 
<reap> ^ 
t i y Ice y = " a c t i on-" value=r'Tinie3taiiip 5 iq ra f : r e " 
< ent ry ke y = " u 3 e z n va lúe =ri wa r eh ou3e".;; 
<entiy key=M3ÍgT:aturePropFiLeri value^'warehoTiselíeystore .prapert ie3 r r /> 
<entry kev=ricasswordCaIIbackCIa33ri value=Norg . ws 1. sampleapplications . 
. . .Warehoi_:3eFa33wordC!allbackrr/> 
d"< ent rv ke y = n s i gna tu r eFartB^-Jra lue= " 
{Elenient]- {ht tp: / /docs . oasis-open . org/wss/2004/01/ 
oa3Í3-2 00401-w33-w33ecuri ty-uti l i ty-l . 0. J;sdfflime31ampj" 
{Elentect]- {http : y/schemas .xmlsoap . org/soap/envelop^^Body "..' 
<./msp> 
</canstznctoz-arg;-
<. bean> 
Fig. 4. Warefrouse Service's Security Confíguration 
4 Related Work 
Among the proposals that deal with the different aspects supported by WS-
Policy, the approach by Ortiz and Hernández [16] is one of the most repre-
sentatives. Their solution makes use of aspect-orientation, Service Cornponent 
Architecture (SCA) rnodeling and a UML (Unified Modeling Language) profile. 
Ours, in change, proposes the use of dornain specific languages (DSLs), more 
adapted to each of the extra-functional aspects in hand, to later combine these 
DSLs into one integrated model. No means to genérate the implementation of 
the security aspects previously mentioned are described in [16]. 
In [12], the use of a security view (a view where security properties are asso-
ciated to functional elements in a process) is suggested. A first approximation 
towards the modeling of security characteristics in event-driven process chains 
(EPCs) is presented, modeling security at a technical level. Sharing the idea 
of the use of views or different models for addressing NF concerns, both ap-
proaches differ (among other things) in that [12]'s doesn't make use of MDA's 
abstract-to-specific chain of transformations, not benefiting from MDA's reuti-
lization capabilities, and that our approach isolates the process modeler from 
technical security knowledge. 
A methodology for an end to end SOA security configuration in proposed 
by [18]. The approach is model-driven, and makes use of templates to express 
identified security patterns, initially added as abstract keywords that represent 
security requirements at business level, and then at a service model level. This 
mapping from business-level requirements to technical intents is a manual task, 
performed by a software architect. Security intents are complemented with a Se-
curity Infrastructure Model (SIM) to later genérate a concrete configuration. The 
SIM, although closer to topology modeling, fulfills an equivalent functionality to 
that of the WS-SecurityPolicy platform model in this work. Our approach and 
the one in [18] differ in that the latter is limited to security, and in, perhaps, the 
greatest strength in this proposal: the use of sepárate concern models to address 
each non-functional characteristic, a feature that aids reuse and modularity of 
design and implementation. 
A security metamodel is presented in [13] to model security considerations 
in business processes, map them to service-oriented architectures, and genér-
ate WS-Security Policy configurations. The focus is on confidentiality, integrity, 
identification, and authentication using patterns. Security goals (primitives) are 
expressed in these models, and policy assertions satisfying these goals are speci-
fied. In our work, the use of domain specific independent metamodels to describe 
the individual concerns facilitates the understanding, analysis, and generation 
of the different aspects of the service individually. The work in [13] uses one 
unique metamodel to express all characteristics of the services, hindering, there-
fore, the autonomous evolution of the different concerns. Additionally, our work 
is not limited to security concerns, being flexible enough to intégrate other type 
of policies. Nonetheless, the work in [13] is sound, and worth of consideration. 
5 Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper has presented a piece of work focused on the achievement of an 
integrated, model-driven solution for the development of service-oriented ar-
chitectures with security and access control support. The different participant 
metamodels have been presented, and a well-known use case, mapped to an 
unmodified, state-of-the-practice commercial framework has been included to 
Alústrate the usefulness of the approach. 
Múltiple domain-specific models independently addressing NF concerns, and 
being independently mapped into target platforms, foster concern models reuse, 
and favors that each concern be addressed in a convenient manner. Additionally, 
the modularity of the approach permits that each concern design, functional or 
not, is not polluted with extraneous information. Finally, the integrated model 
offers a practical way of measuring and analyzing the system in early stages of 
the development. 
The proposed solution presents great flexibility in its evolution regarding the 
appearance of new standards or technologies. Moreover, the WS-Policy frame-
work itself has been defined in a generic fashion, allowing for many s tandards 
to be formulated based on it. Consequently, all s tandards already available, or 
in process of being defined under its umbrella may easily be supported by this 
solution, and its assertions can readily be applied. This leverages its use for 
developing not only security-aware services, but also include reliability, timing 
constraints, secure exchange, transactions, etc. 
Wi th respect to future work, in the short term it will be focused on the 
completion of a prototype tool for the CIM-PIM-PSM chain. In a longer term, 
it is planned to consider other policy aspects under standardization process, 
to be able to use the information intrinsic to the assertions (for shaping of 
code generation, configuration of target platform, generation/use of an extra-
functional aspect, etc.). 
On a different token, the shifting from a generation approach based on a 
monolithic metamodel, towards a composition-based generation approach (in 
which any metamodel could be used to genérate artifacts based on a set of 
weaving associations) could provide an alternative line of research. 
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